A New Start for New START

Posted: 5th December 2025

Back in September I participated in a unique exercise, together with former Congressman Dennis Kucinich, MIT professor Ted Postol, and retired CIA analyst Ray McGovern, where we discussed the prospects for the extension of the New START treaty, and what conditions would have to exist politically in both Russia and the United States to achieve this goal. Known as the Poughkeepsie Peace Initiative, this gathering of the minds, so to speak, unfolded over the course of three days, during which time we wrestled with the many problems that could arise that could block the extension of New START, and the domestic political hurdles that would need to overcome to bring the issue of treaty extension to President Trump’s attention. The conclave ended with all of us agreeing to reconvene following my scheduled visits to Russia, in October and November, where I hoped to be able to engage Russian officials on issues related to arms control and nuclear disarmament, including New START.

The October visit, which took place on the occasion of RT’s 20th Anniversary Gala, helped shape the informational space, so to speak, leaving me with high expectations for my scheduled November trip. One reason for such optimism was that certain assurances had been made during a previous visit to Russia, in August of this year, regarding access to influential Russian figures, including those in positions of authority. However, my arrival coincided with the announcement of the Alaska Summit between Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin. The Russian government, understandably so, put a moratorium on interviews by high-level officials so as not to generate any controversy in the lead up to this important meeting. I was told at that time that things should calm down by November, and I should plan on returning then.

My November trip, however, turned out to be disappointing when it came to getting the promised access. The Russians were strangely reticent when it came to explaining why November suddenly turned into an inconvenient time for the kind of discussions I wanted to have. The Ministry of Defense made it clear that now was not the time to be discussing arms control, and when I tried to organize a panel discussion with the Valdai Club on arms control and disarmament, we were quickly put on notice by the Kremlin that the nuclear issue was not open to discussion at this time.

While I was still in Russia, the news broke about a 28-point peace plan that had apparently been brokered as a result of meetings that took place at the end of October in Miami, Florida between Steve Witkoff, Trump’s special envoy for Russia, and Kirill Dmitriev, his Russian counterpart. Suddenly the source of the Russian reticence became crystal clear—as had been the case in August, the Russians did not want to get ahead of their skis when it came to US-Russian relations.

This point was further driven home when the details of the 28-point peace plan were leaked to the press. Point 17 was particularly informative: “The US and Russia will agree to extend the validity of treaties on the non-proliferation and control of nuclear weapons, including the New START Treaty.”

The very discussions I was seeking to promote between Russia and the US were already taking place. There was no need to muddy the waters by engaging in dialogue with someone who would not be party to whatever agreement would be reached.

So now the question is, what next?

There are some knowns that have emerged from this experience. First and foremost, the New START treaty cannot simply be extended by the stroke of a pen—the treaty text does not allow for this.

Two, it is virtually impossible to negotiate a comprehensive follow-on treaty vehicle that would take into account the myriad of arms control issues that have manifested themselves since the New START treaty was signed in 2010. Issues such as how to account for the new generation of nuclear delivery systems that have been fielded by Russia, the demise of the INF treaty, and what to do about missile defense are all too complex to resolved in the short time that exists before New START expires.

Third, President Putin’s offer of a voluntary moratorium on the caps on the number of deployed nuclear weapons set by New START, while valid and made in good faith, cannot survive the tests he himself laid out regarding red lines to this offer—the deployment of the planned “Golden Dome” missile defense system, and the planned deployment of “Dark Eagle” intermediate-range hypersonic missiles in Germany next year.

There appears to be only one path forward that could see the New START treaty continue to serve as the foundational agreement upon which future US-Russian arms control negotiations could be conducted—simply put, the treaty would need to be embraced as it, with no amendments or modifications, and endorsed by both Trump and Putin as a new treaty. Given the fact that both the US Senate and Russian Duma had previously ratified the New START treaty, it is not a stretch of the imagination to believe that rapid ratification of a re-born New START treaty could be accomplished by both the US and Russia.

By breathing new life into a 15-year old treaty, Russia and the US would engender a sense of strategic stability which could anchor the necessary negotiations about new strategic weapons, INF missiles, and ABM defenses that would need to take place. Moreover, given the fact that China has just published a new arms control white paper which puts the onus on both the US and Russia to enter into serious talks about significantly cutting the size of their respective nuclear arsenals before China could see fit to join into any multilateral arms control discussions, a revival of New START would serve the purpose of preventing the kind of nuclear arms race which would make such negotiations impossible.

The question now is what kind of pressure, if any, can be put on the Trump administration to act on Point 17 of the Ukraine-Russia peace plan. Is it wise to have nuclear arms control be held hostage to the various issues and actors that are conspiring to undermine Trump’s push for peace? Should Congress be engaged in an effort to assist this process by fast-tracking the ratification process for any future agreement?

These are the issues that I and the other members of the Poughkeepsie Peace Initiative will be contemplating in the coming days. Difficult issues, yes. But we are in a good place, where the question that confronted us back in September regarding if the Trump administration would be amenable to extending the New START treaty has been positively answered. 

Now we just have to help Trump and his team get across the finish line.

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